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International arbitration has become increasingly attractive 
as an alternative mechanism for parties to international 
commercial disputes.1 In many cases national courts are 
less suitable for settlement of such complex international 
transactions, and arbitration is structured specifically to facilitate 
resolution of disputes arising from transactions between parties 
from different countries.2 
Because interim measures in international arbitration involve 
the intersection of national law and arbitral power, a degree of 
conceptual uniformity is required if interim measures are to 
complement arbitral effectiveness, as they are designed to do. In 
order to encourage harmonization regarding the definition and 
scope of interim protection of rights in international arbitration, 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) amended Article 17 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law (“Model Law”) provision on interim measures in 
2006 to define tribunal powers to grant interim measures and 
to describe the enforcement role of national courts.3 Soon 
thereafter, the Commission undertook to revise the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (“Arbitration Rules”) to promote greater 
efficiency in arbitration and reflect developments in the practice 
of international arbitration, which took the form of greater 
consistency between the Model Law and the Arbitration Rules.4 
The new Rules became effective August 15, 2010.
Although several provisions of new Article 26 of the Rules 
on interim measures mirror the amended 2006 Model Law 
exactly, small but significant variations between them reflect the 
fundamental difference in their natures and objectives, as well 
as years of debate as to the implications of incorporating certain 
provisions.5 Most significantly, the revised Arbitration Rules 
incorporate no enforcement provisions, a broader definition of 
interim measures, a slightly dissimilar standard for damages 
liability for interim measures, and no mention whatsoever 
of highly controversial preliminary orders.6 Generally, the 
revised Arbitration Rules represent a prudent overhaul that will 
complement the Model Law, but in light of their disparities and 
the fact that very few states have adopted legislation based on 
the amended Model law,7 the modernized framework for interim 
measures may face certain challenges. 
II. Background
Essentially, interim measures are grants of temporary relief8 
aimed at protecting parties’ rights pending final resolution of a 
dispute.9 Many legal systems recognize the procedural necessity 
1 See Dana Renee Bucy, Comment, How to Best Protect Party Rights: The Future of Interim Relief in International Commercial Arbitration Under the Amended 
UNCITRAL Model Law, 25 am. u. int’l l. rev. 579 (2010) (explaining how increased volume of international commercial disputes results from rise in international 
trade, and that parties more frequently favor arbitration to national courts).
2 See Julian D.M. Lew, Foreword, in ali yeSilirmak, proviSional meaSureS in international commercial arbitration v (2005) (citing unacceptability of national 
courts and specific structure of arbitration as reasons for international arbitration’s success).
3 See u.n. comm’n on int’l traDe law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 
(2008), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Model Law] (expanding Article 17 into new 
Chapter IV A on Interim Measures).
4 See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 104-05, delivered to the General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/614 (Oct. 5, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Working Group Report]. (agreeing that the new version of the Rules should be revised “in light of ” Chapter 
IV A of the Model Law).
5 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Model Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010, art. 26, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Arbitration Rules]. 
6 Id. art. 26, ¶¶ 2, 8.
7 See UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 4(l), delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/694 (May 26, 2010) 
(reporting that only three countries and the American state of Florida have adopted legislation based on the 2006 Model Law).
8 yeSilirmak, supra note 2, at 6 (2005).
9 Id. at 7.
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of interim measures as a complement to final awards,10 and in 
the context of international arbitration provisional measures 
may be even more crucial due to the special risks involved in 
international disputes.11 Often the efficacy of the arbitration 
process as a whole depends on interim measures that may prevent 
adverse parties from destroying or removing assets so as to 
render final arbitral awards meaningless.12 Interim measures are 
usually designed either to minimize loss, damage, or prejudice 
during proceedings, or to facilitate the enforcement of final 
awards.13 Under the 1976 Rules, little legal consensus existed 
as to the proper scope and implementation of interim measures 
in international arbitration, thus the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules were revised to reflect accord with the Model Law and 
its standards. In particular, the new Arbitration Rules unify 
and clarify the function of interim measures in international 
arbitration and are intended for universal application.14
The 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are presumed to 
apply to all arbitration agreements which reference the Rules. 
The Rules were originally published in 1976, when arbitration 
was not as widespread an alternative to domestic courts, and 
are intended for use by parties from both common and civil law 
systems. They represent the foremost set of ad hoc arbitration 
rules,15 which are rules for conducting arbitration without 
the oversight of an arbitral institution or other permanent 
administering body. Thus, the Rules are typically used in non-
institutional arbitrations, but they also provide the basis for the 
international rules of some arbitral institutions, many of which 
offer to administer arbitrations conducted according to the 
Rules, or have adopted the Rules in whole or substantial part as 
their own institutional rules. Many bilateral investment treaties 
also cite the UNCITRAL Rules as an option for disputes to be 
referred to arbitration.16
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are fundamentally 
different than the Model Law in that they are designed to enable 
greater flexibility and compatibility to parties from diverse 
states than are available under national laws.17 Because the 
Arbitration Rules are directed at parties, whereas the Model 
Law is directed at legislatures, the UNCITRAL Working Group 
was tasked with revising the Rules to show consistency with 
the Model Law18 without altering “the structure of the text, its 
spirit, [or] its drafting style.”19 This mandate recognized that 
because the Rules have been so widely adopted and enjoy such 
widespread adherence, the revised version had to “respect the 
flexibility of the text rather than make it more complex.”20 The 
Rules were thus expected to maintain their characteristically 
generic approach, which is easily adapted and applicable to 
a broad range of circumstances, because this very flexibility 
and simplicity make them attractive to diverse parties21 and 
because they are intended as a package that parties can utilize 
unchanged.22 
Although the Rules’ new Article 26 on Interim Measures 
is significantly more detailed than its predecessor from 1976, 
it is also much less substantial than Chapter IV A in the 2006 
Model Law.23 This variation in scope not only corresponds to a 
general difference in applicability, but also reveals more subtle 
differences in range of application when considered in light of 
smaller textual variations. The differences mean, on one hand, 
that the Rules are better suited for adherence by individual 
parties to international disputes; but on the other hand, certain 
ambiguities remedied by the amended Model Law remain 
unresolved under the Rules.
III. Analysis
There are four main areas in which the 2010 Arbitration 
Rules diverge from the 2006 Model Law on interim measures. 
First, the Rules do not include provisions on enforcement 
of interim measures, whereas the Model Law does. Second, 
the Rules include more specific wording in their definition of 
the circumstances and conditions in which interim measures 
are allowed, with the effect that the Rules’ regime on interim 
measures is wider in applicability than the Model Law’s. Third, 
the Rules more clearly allocate the risk of incurring liability 
for damages caused by imposition of interim measures than 
the Model Law. Lastly, and most perplexingly, the Model Law 
10 See gary b. born, international commercial arbitration: commentary anD materialS 920 (2d ed. 2001) (listing sequestration of property, preservation of status 
quo, posting of security, attachment of funds, and appointment of neutral third parties to specific tasks as general forms of provisional measures); the uncitral 
arbitration ruleS: a commentary 53 (Philip Alston & Vaughan Lowe eds., 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL arbitration ruleS commentary] (noting that both 
national and international legal systems provide remedies and procedures for interim measures in various forms, and that requests for interim measures have been 
relatively frequent in international legal fora).
11 See born, supra note 10, at 920 (referring to increased danger international disputes that vital evidence will be removed from tribunals’ reach, or that assets 
necessary for enforcement of a final award may be removed to a jurisdiction where enforcement is unlikely).
12 Id. at 920; Bucy, supra note 1, at 584.
13 Bucy, supra note 1, at 586.
14 Compare 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 26, with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 26, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. 
Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Arbitration Rules], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf.
15 See born, supra note 10, at 45-46.
16 uncitral arbitration ruleS commentary, supra note 10, at 10.
17 2006 Working Group Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 17-19. 
18 See id. ¶ 105 (noting that the revised Rules should either mirror the Model Law by clarifying the circumstances, conditions, and procedure for granting interim 
measures or by giving the same effect to party autonomy under Chapter IV A).
19 uncitral, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its Forty-Seventh Session, ¶¶ 3, 7, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/641 (Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Working Group Report].
20 Id. ¶ 3.
21 2006 Working Group Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 17, 18.
22 See UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 2-3, delivered to the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/705 (May 5, 2010) (drawing the Commission’s attention to 1982 “Recommendations” issued as encouragement for parties and 
institutions to utilize the Rules without alteration, and suggesting that a similar set of guidelines be prepared to accompany the revised Rules).
23 Compare 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 26, with 2006 Model Law, supra note 3, art. 17.
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contains extensive provisions on ex parte preliminary orders, 
whereas the Rules contain none. These differences may seem 
minor, but could have potential ramifications for the effectiveness 
of interim measures as an arbitral tool. 
A. Enforcement Provisions Outside the Rules’ 
Scope and Therefore Excluded
Due to the nature of the Rules, as a structural framework for 
parties agreeing to arbitration instead of a legislative regime, the 
Working Group agreed in its earliest meeting that the provisions 
of Model Law Chapter IV A regarding enforcement of arbitral 
awards would not be included in the revised Arbitration 
Rules.24 Where the Model Law contains detailed provisions 
relating to recognition and enforcement of interim measures25 
and court-ordered interim measures,26 the Arbitration Rules 
are understandably silent. Model Law enforcement provisions 
requiring national courts to recognize arbitral interim measures, 
as well as specifying grounds for refusing recognition,27 are 
outside the scope of any arbitral tribunal’s power. Likewise, no 
independent agreement to abide by the decisions of an arbitral 
tribunal could dictate the scope of national courts’ powers to 
issue interim measures concurrently; this is a matter solely 
within the purview of domestic legislatures.28
Addition of enforcement provisions to the Arbitration Rules 
was never contemplated29 because such provisions would have 
been incompatible with the Rules’ capacity, but this omission 
does not adversely affect the Rules’ applicability to arbitral 
agreements. To put it differently, the scope and function of 
interim measures under the Arbitration Rules are not adversely 
affected because the rules to which independent parties agree to 
abide by could never encompass such measures.
However, to the extent that enforcement of interim measures 
depends on enforcement by national courts, the Arbitration 
Rules’ range is limited as it always was. Because the Arbitration 
Rules were specifically revised to complement the Model Law, 
in states where domestic legislation reflects the Model Law or 
is equivalent in effect, effectiveness of arbitral interim measures 
should be assured because state courts are empowered to 
enforce them. Unfortunately, very few states have incorporated 
the amended Model Law by passing parallel legislature, so 
the intended effect of the combined UNCITRAL Model Law 
amendments and Arbitration Rules revisions regarding interim 
measures (enhanced efficacy of arbitration process via greater 
certainty regarding implementation of interim measures) is 
somewhat dampened, leaving enforcement of arbitral awards as 
uncertain and subject to disparate domestic laws as ever. 
B. Definition of Interim Measures so as 
to Provide Guidance without Limiting 
Applicability
Generally, the Arbitration Rules’ revised Article 26 evinces 
an approach to interim measures designed to provide clear 
guidelines for the interim measure process without limiting 
its applicability in a broad range of situations. Although the 
goal of the Rules revision was to delineate the circumstances, 
conditions and procedure for the granting of interim measures,30 
the Rules must be applicable to all types of arbitration regardless 
of the subject matter of the dispute, and easily adapted for use 
in a variety of circumstances.31 This approach was adopted from 
the outset of the Working Group when it agreed that the original 
wording of Article 26(1), which provided that arbitral tribunals 
“may take any interim measures deemed necessary in respect 
of the subject-matter of the dispute,”32 should be modified in 
accordance with the new Model Law. The words “in respect of 
the subject-matter of the dispute” were deleted from equivalent 
provisions of the Model Law, and the Working Group deleted 
them from the Arbitration Rules as well for being “overly 
restrictive”33 as to what circumstances may justify interim 
measures.
The revised Rules also reflect a broad approach to 
applicability in their definition of interim measures. The 
decision to include a detailed definition of interim measures and 
the circumstances for their application in Article 26 was taken in 
order to “provide necessary guidance and legal certainty to the 
arbitrators and the parties” to disputes, particularly important 
for legal systems unfamiliar with the use of interim measures. 
Article 26(2) defines an interim measure as:
… any temporary measure by which, at any time prior to 
the issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally 
decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party, for example 
and without limitation, to:
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination 
of the dispute;
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking 
action that is likely to cause, (i) current or imminent 
harm or (ii) prejudice to the arbitral process itself;
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a 
subsequent award may be satisfied; or
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material 
to the resolution of the dispute.34
24 2006 Working Group Report, supra note 4, ¶ 104-05.
25 2006 Model Law, supra note 3, art. 17(H).
26 Id. art. 17(I).
27 Id. art. 17(H).
28 See id. art. 17(J) (confirming that national courts have the same power to issue interim measures in relation to arbitral proceedings as they have in relation to their 
own domestic proceedings).
29 See UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 2, delivered to Working Group II 
(Arbitration and Conciliation), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.145/Add.1 (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Rules Revision] (containing Draft revision modeled after 
the Model Law, but not including measures on enforcement or national courts).
30 2006 Working Group Report, supra note 4, ¶ 105.
31 Id. ¶¶ 17, 18.
32 2006 Rules Revision, supra note 29, ¶ 2.
33 2006 Working Group Report, supra note 4, ¶ 105.
34 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 26(2).
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This definition is very similar to Chapter IV A of the Model 
Law on interim measures. In response to opposition based on 
the difference in nature between the Rules and Model Law, and 
on the concern that a detailed definition might limit the power 
of arbitral tribunals to grant interim measures in jurisdictions 
that took a more liberal approach than the Model Law, the 
Working Group noted that this definition consists of a “generic 
and exhaustive list intended to cover all instances in which an 
interim measure might be granted,” and that detailed provisions 
on conditions for granting interim measures are necessary to 
avoid difficulties of interpretation and application.35 The Rules 
therefore parallel the Model Law closely, so as to “encourage 
development of practice” in accordance with UNCITRAL 
standards.36
However, the Rules depart from the Model Law in several 
ways that reinforce their aim to be as broadly applicable as 
possible. For instance, the Arbitration Rules omit from their 
definition a clause contained in the Model Law providing that 
temporary measures are appropriate “whether in the form of 
an award or another form.”37 By eliminating this clause, the 
Rules do not limit the form of the temporary measure, but avoid 
explicitly encouraging awards as a permissible form for interim 
measures. In the past practitioners might have used the form of an 
award with a view to enhancing enforceability,38 but consistency 
with the Model Law would make such practice unnecessary 
because interim measures are to be enforced regardless of the 
form in which they are issued. Another reason for eliminating 
the explicit sanction of awards was to avoid confusion in light 
of Article 26(5), which permits arbitral tribunals to modify 
or suspend interim measures.39 More generally, this revision 
provides leeway under the differing approaches of domestic 
legal systems, some of which permit interim measures in the 
form of awards and some of which do not.40 
Because the Model Law’s enforcement mechanisms have 
not been universally adopted, requests for interim measures in 
the form of awards may still be attractive as a tool for enhancing 
enforceability in some arbitral seats, but the Rules’ silence as 
to what form interim measures may take do not preclude the 
use of awards. Instead, they merely refuse to expressly sanction 
the form of awards, which makes the Rules more flexible and 
broadly acceptable where domestic law prohibits interim awards.
Furthermore, the Rules’ definition of interim measures 
diverges from the Model Law by including the words “for 
example and without limitation” in the chapeau of Article 26(2). 
This addition was made to clarify that the Rules’ definition of 
interim measures should be widely construed.41 Although the 
definition and list, which mirrors the Model Law almost exactly, 
is intended to be comprehensive, the insertion of “without 
limitation” contemplates the possibility of other types of interim 
measures not found in the list.42 The draft clause providing that 
the definition of an interim measure “includes [the listed items], 
without limitation” was further changed to “for example and 
without limitation” so as to emphasize the non-exclusive nature 
of paragraph (2).43
Another small difference between the Model Law and the 
Arbitration Rules is the editorial clarification of Article 26(2)
(b): by clearly separating “current or imminent harm” from 
“prejudice to the arbitral process,”44 the Rules expressly broaden 
the range of actions to be prevented or refrained from. Without 
the clear distinction between harm and prejudice, the clause 
could be understood to refer only to prejudice to the arbitral 
process. Thus, by eliminating ambiguity that existed under the 
Model Law, the Rules’ seemingly minute clarification explicitly 
widens the categories of circumstances under which interim 
measures may be granted.
The overall effect of the Arbitration Rules’ small departures 
from the Model Law in their definition of interim measures 
is actually to provide more detailed guidelines regarding the 
scope and conditions for interim measures, without limiting 
their applicability and acceptability to a wide variety of parties 
and disputes. By eliminating language singling out awards as 
appropriate forms for interim measures and by explicitly noting 
that the definitions listed in Article 26(2) are not necessarily 
exhaustive, the Rules embrace a wider range of options than the 
Model Law. By making a clear distinction between conditions 
triggering imposition of interim measures, the Rules ensure that 
such measures can be used to prevent prejudice to the arbitral 
process as well as other kinds of current or imminent harm. This 
modified definition combined with a less restrictive description 
of the circumstances justifying use of interim measures means 
that even though the revised Rules on interim measures are 
much more substantial then the simple text of 1976, they do not 
depart from their characteristic motif of universal applicability.
C. Liability for Damages Carries Assumption of 
Risk
Article 26(8) of the revised Arbitration Rules provides that 
the party requesting interim relief may be liable for any costs 
35 uncitral, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its Fiftieth Session, ¶¶ 87-88, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/669 (March 9, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Working Group Report].
36 Id. ¶ 89.
37 2007 Working Group Report, supra note 19, ¶ 51; compare 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 6, art. 26(2), with 2006 Model Law, supra note 3, art. 17(2).
38 See yeSilirmak, supra note 2, at 190-97 (noting that awards are generally considered enforceable under the New York Convention where other orders are not, and 
that parties request interim awards to enhance the possibility of enforcing the final award).
39 Id. ¶ 51.
40 See id. at 193 (noting the view that the form of awards for interim measures may be inappropriate because interim measures are not intended to have final effect and 
can be “revised at any time”).
41 Compare UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 13, art. 26(2), delivered to 
Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.151/Add.1 (Aug. 6, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Rules Revision], with 2010 Arbitration 
Rules, supra note 5, art. 26(2).
42 2009 Working Group Report, supra note 35, ¶ 92.
43 Compare 2009 Working Group Report, supra note 35, ¶¶ 93-94, with 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 26(2).
44 Compare 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 26(2)(b), with 2006 Model Law, supra note 3, art. 17(2)(b).
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and damages caused by the interim measure. The final adopted 
version is carefully worded so as to elucidate the scope of risk 
the parties to a dispute accept. The draft of the revisions required 
that in order for such liability to occur, the arbitral tribunal would 
have to grant an interim measure and later determine that “in 
the circumstances, the measure should not have been granted.”45 
One concern regarding the provision was that the allocation of 
risk according to this standard would be unbalanced because the 
party requesting an interim measure would be liable in situations 
where that party disclosed in good faith all the information and 
documents in its possession and where the arbitral tribunal made 
a later determination that the measure was unjustified.46 On the 
other hand, however, the Working Group noted that the party 
requesting a measure takes the risk of damaging other parties, 
and such damage should be repaired if the measure is later 
determined not to have been justified.47 It also acknowledged 
that some national laws and arbitration rules contain similar 
provisions, serving the useful purpose of indicating to parties 
the risks associated with a request for an interim measure.48
The Rules needed to address the possible effect of the 
provision that a requesting party sustains liability for costs and 
damages in situations where the conditions of Article 26 on 
interim measures had been met but the requesting party loses 
the arbitration.49 This includes situations in which the granting 
of the interim measure was not justified in light of the outcome 
of the case, in particular where the arbitral tribunal found the 
claim for which the interim measure was sought invalid.50 In 
order to address this concern, various proposals were made. 
One suggestion was to eliminate a definition of the conditions 
triggering liability for costs and damages, leaving those aspects 
to be dealt with under applicable domestic law.51 In this vein, the 
Working Group examined how several domestic legal systems 
dealt with the assignation of liability for damages that might 
result from the granting of interim measures52 and considered 
several textual alternatives, including substitution of “was not 
justified” for “should not have been granted.”53
Ultimately, the provision was included and worded so that 
damages can be awarded “if the arbitral tribunal determines that, 
in the circumstances then prevailing, the measure should not 
have been granted.”54 This pairing of the temporal requirement 
and the determination that the measure “should not have been 
granted” is consistent with the Model Law but provides more 
clearly for liability in cases where an interim measure was 
granted in compliance with all conditions, but was later found 
to cause damages. Thus, the final version adopted in the revised 
Arbitration Rules provides for allocation of risk to the party 
requesting an interim measure, so that the requesting party will 
incur damages if it loses the arbitration and the claim for which it 
sought the interim measure is invalidated, even if the conditions 
for granting an interim measure were met. This allocation of 
risk will not only dissuade parties from acting in bad faith by 
requesting measures that will later turn out to be unjustified,55 
but will ensure a fair outcome by awarding damages caused by 
interim measures based on the ultimate outcome of the dispute.
D. Omission of Preliminary Orders from Rules 
Regime
The most controversial issue the Working Group faced 
regarding revision of the Arbitration Rules was whether and 
how to include provisions on ex parte preliminary orders. Under 
the 2006 Model Law regime, an arbitral tribunal may grant 
a preliminary order upon request by a party, without notice 
of the request to any other party, if in the circumstances the 
arbitral tribunal found that prior disclosure of the request might 
frustrate the purpose of the measure.56 This type of preliminary 
order may be desirable when the need for interim protection of 
rights is exceptionally urgent or when the element of surprise is 
necessary.57 The Model Law provisions on preliminary orders 
had been quite controversial, but the main debate within the 
Working Group on Arbitration Rules did not concern the content 
of these provisions; instead, the question was whether inclusion 
of provisions on preliminary orders was appropriate for the 
Rules context.58
On one hand, inclusion of provisions on preliminary orders 
would clarify procedures and enhance effectiveness of interim 
45 2006 Rules Revision, supra note 29, ¶ 2.
46 2007 Working Group Report, supra note 19, ¶ 49.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 2009 Working Group Report, supra note 35, ¶ 116.
50 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its Fifty-Second Session, ¶ 92, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/688 (Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Working Group Report]; see UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 28, delivered to Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.157/Add.1 (Dec. 10, 
2009) [hereinafter 2009 Rules Revision] (illuminating the particular situation of concern in which liability incurs when the claim for which interim measure sought 
is judged invalid).
51 2009 Working Group Report, supra note 35, ¶ 117.
52 Id. ¶ 118; see UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Interim Measures of Protection—Liability Regime, Note by the Secretariat, delivered to Working 
Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.127 (Jan. 27, 200) (presenting a summary of liability regimes in several countries and relevant 
work of international organizations).
53 2010 Working Group Report, supra note 50, ¶ 93; see 2009 Rules Revision, supra note 50, ¶ 25 (suggesting textual alternatives “in view of all the circumstances” 
and “was not justified”).
54 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 5, art. 26(8).
55 See UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Compilation of Comments by Governments and International 
Organizations, 10-11, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/704 (May 4, 2010) (in which the Arab Association for International Arbitration (AAIA) 
approves adoption of Article 26(8) because it will deter parties from acting in bad faith).
56 2007 Working Group Report, supra note 19, ¶¶ 53-60.
57 yeSilirmak, supra note 2, at 220 (giving as examples the likelihood trade secrets will be disclosed, assets dissipated, or vital evidence disposed of).
58 2007 Working Group Report, supra note 19, ¶ 53.
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measures; but, on the other hand, they may also be inappropriate 
due to the nature of the Rules, as well as create confusion as 
to arbitrators’ ability to grant such measures. Omission of 
provisions on preliminary orders would acknowledge the 
different natures and purposes of the Rules (directed at parties) 
and the Model Law (directed at legislatures), and the lack of 
consensus among international arbitration practitioners as to the 
acceptability of such procedures.59 Inclusion of provisions on 
preliminary orders could also undermine their acceptability in 
certain contexts,60 or create the false impression that arbitrators 
are empowered to grant such orders even though the applicable 
domestic law prohibits them.61 Furthermore, in order to 
maintain the Rules’ wide acceptability and applicability, the 
Working Group was charged with revision that did not alter the 
“style, structure, and drafting style” of the original Rules, such 
that inclusion of lengthy provisions on preliminary orders like 
those in the Model Law might create the impression that the 
mechanism is a key aspect of the Rules, whereas preliminary 
orders are rarely used in practice. According to the revision 
mandate, then, the Rules’ flexibility would be best maintained 
by keeping them short and simple.62
However, justification for inclusion of ex parte preliminary 
order provisions in the Arbitration Rules stems from the notion 
that the Rules are part of a compromise package, accepted by the 
parties to arbitration, which enable the arbitral tribunal to prevent 
frustration of the purpose of an interim measure, subject to 
safeguards.63 Additionally, because in some cases arbitrators do 
issue preliminary orders, inclusion of relevant provisions would 
provide procedural guidance and contribute to harmonization 
on a relatively unsettled practice in international arbitration.64 
In fact, failure to include such provisions could undermine 
the effectiveness of interim measures, so that lengthiness of 
the provisions should not prevent their inclusion.65 Because 
application of the Rules would come as a result of parties’ 
agreement to abide by their provisions, empowerment of the 
arbitral tribunal to issue preliminary orders would be the result 
of a conscious decision of the parties instead of a source of 
conflict (between parties or with the applicable domestic law).66
The Working Group agreed that unless prohibited by 
applicable domestic law the Rules in and of themselves do not 
prohibit the arbitral tribunal from issuing preliminary orders67 
and crafted the following provision as compromise effort 
to outline a basic structure for granting of ex parte interim 
measures:
If the arbitral tribunal determines that disclosure of a 
request for an interim measure to the party against 
whom it is directed risks frustrating that measure’s 
purpose, nothing in these Rules prevents the tribunal, 
when it gives notice of such request to that party, from 
issuing a temporary order that the party not frustrate the 
purpose of the requested measure. The arbitral tribunal 
shall give that party the earliest practicable opportunity 
to present its case and then determine whether to grant 
the requested measure.68
This short provision departed substantially from the lengthy 
provisions on preliminary orders contained in the Model Law,69 
and omitted the specific terminology “preliminary orders” so as 
to avoid controversy over the definition of that term and allow for 
deference to governing domestic law.70 However, it was unable 
to overcome several basic objections. First, as a derivative of 
the fundamental difference between the Rules (contractual in 
nature, directed at parties) and the Model Law (legislative in 
nature), the characteristics of ex parte preliminary orders are 
contrary to the consensual nature of arbitration. Indeed, many 
legal systems do not permit preliminary orders under their 
domestic law on arbitration, and even several states considering 
enactment of Chapter IV A of the Model law are contemplating 
omission of its provisions on preliminary orders.71 In several 
jurisdictions, the granting of ex parte preliminary orders could 
give rise to objections based on violations of due process of law 
and parties’ right to be heard.72 
Opposition to the provision considered omission of 
preliminary orders from the Rules regime the most prudent way 
to accommodate widely varying approaches to such mechanisms 
in different legal systems. Specifically, in some jurisdictions 
domestic courts grant preliminary orders pursuant to certain 
safeguards, whereas those safeguards might be absent under the 
arbitration proceedings. The principle of judicial impartiality 
is particularly implicated in this regard.73 For example, in a 
domestic court the judge granting the preliminary order may not 
be the same judge to decide the merits of the case, whereas in 
arbitration the arbitrator would decide both issues, potentially 
59 Id. ¶ 54.
60 See id. ¶ 55 (noting that States in particular may object, especially in the context of investor-state disputes).
61 Id.
62 Id. 
63 Id. ¶ 56.
64 Id.
65 Id. ¶ 57.
66 Id. ¶ 58.
67 Id. ¶ 59.
68 2008 Rules Revision, supra note 41, ¶ 13, art. 26(5).
69 See 2006 Model Law, supra note 3, art. 17(B), (C) (including eight separate provisions on preliminary orders).
70 2007 Working Group Report, supra note 19, ¶ 60.
71 2009 Working Group Report, supra note 35, ¶ 101.
72 Id.; see also yeSilirmak, supra note 2, at 222-23 (noting that both the ICSID and ICC Arbitration regimes do not permit ex parte measures due to inconsistency with 
their provisions on the right to be heard, which is also recognized in the Arbitration Rules; but that many legal systems do recognize ex parte measures as valid when 
urgency is a factor).
73 See yeSilirmak, supra note 2, at 224-225 (proposing that impartiality of a fact-finder would normally prevent ex parte communication with parties to the dispute, 
but that ex parte interim measures could be an exception based on fairness and urgency).
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prejudicing the outcome of the proceedings.74 These kinds of 
discrepancies could undermine the acceptability of the Rules to 
a broad category of parties.
Advocates of the provision on preliminary measures invoked 
its necessity as a guiding and harmonizing measure directed at 
existing arbitral practice that is not incompatible with applicable 
domestic laws.75 Omission of the provision would not preclude 
arbitral tribunals from issuing preliminary orders, and when 
applicable domestic law prohibited preliminary orders that law 
would supersede the Rules in any case.76 Furthermore, deletion 
of the provision could produce undesirable interpretations 
of the Rules as generally disallowing preliminary orders, and 
produce inconsistency with UNCITRAL arbitration standards 
and the Model Law by allowing parties to agree to arbitration, 
but obliging or encouraging them to turn to domestic courts to 
obtain preliminary orders.77 Accordingly, some objections to 
the provision could be addressed via clarification that arbitral 
tribunals are not empowered to grant preliminary orders in legal 
systems prohibiting them, or that power to grant preliminary 
orders must derive from domestic legislation.78
The Working Group finally agreed to replace the original 
draft provision with a more neutral approach to preliminary 
orders aimed at reconciling these diverging views:79
Nothing in these rules shall have the effect of creating, 
(where it does not exist), or limiting, (where it does 
exist), any right of a party to apply to the arbitral tribunal 
for, and any powers of the arbitral tribunal to issue, an 
interim measure without prior notice to a party.80
In this form, however, the provision did not mention 
“preliminary orders,” and so the term was added along with 
a descriptive phrase to clarify meaning for parties unfamiliar 
with it.81 In order to avoid the awkwardness of bracketed text, it 
was deleted and the provision supplemented with an additional 
phrase, so that the final version of the compromise draft article 
read:
Nothing in these Rules shall have the effect of creating 
a right, or of limiting any right which may exist outside 
these Rules, of a party to apply to the arbitral tribunal 
for, and any power of the tribunal to issue, in either case 
without prior notice to a party, a preliminary order that 
the party not frustrate the purpose of a requested interim 
measure.82
This version of Article 26(9) was included in the final 
draft of the revised Arbitration Rules presented to the General 
Assembly before their adoption in June 2010.83
Unfortunately, these hasty revisions may have been the 
undoing of preliminary orders as part of the Rules regime on 
interim measures, because Article 26(9) on preliminary orders 
mysteriously disappeared from the adopted revision of the 
Arbitration Rules that went into effect in August 2010. The 
provision was confirmed in an intermediate 2009 draft as the 
agreed upon proposal to reconcile diverging perspectives on 
inclusion of preliminary orders, with a note that the Working 
Group may wish to return to the issue. However, the Working 
Group did not address Article 26(9) in subsequent sessions, 
and sent it unchanged to the General Assembly in 2010. Yet the 
adopted version of the Arbitration Rules omits the provision on 
preliminary orders entirely, and no further explanation of its 
removal exists anywhere.
The only clue to its disappearance lies in a close reading 
of the provision in comparison with previous draft versions, 
and in the comments of several governments and international 
organizations on the draft articles, both of which suggest that the 
amended wording of Article 26(9) is legally incomprehensible.84 
In its original form, the text of the draft compromise provision 
indicated that nothing creates a nonexistent right or limits an 
existing right of a party to apply for ex parte interim measures, 
just as nothing creates a nonexistent power or limits an existing 
power of an arbitral tribunal to award such measures. This 
neutral wording explicitly confirmed that the arbitral agreement 
could neither affect, nor create any additional arbitral powers 
outside of, the applicable domestic legal regime for preliminary 
measures; but it also allowed for the right of parties to request 
and the power of arbitral tribunals to issue preliminary orders ex 
parte unless applicable domestic law prohibited such measures, 
although it did not explicitly confirm that right or power.
However, after the brackets were deleted, the phrase “which 
may exist outside these rules” was inappropriately added so that 
instead of referring to both party rights and arbitral tribunal 
powers under the applicable domestic regime, it referred only to 
limitation of party rights under domestic law. This had the odd 
effect of protecting the rights of parties under domestic law to 
request ex parte orders if such rights existed, but not affording 
such rights to parties under the arbitration agreement, even if 
such rights existed under domestic law. Even more confusing 
was the provision’s treatment of “any power of the tribunal to 
issue … a preliminary order,” because the text does not indicate 
whether that power is not created or not limited, and if it were 
limited then such limitation would seem to apply only to powers 
that exist “outside [the] Rules.” Thus, the final wording of the 
draft provision’s legal effect was completely contrary to its aim, 
74 2009 Working Group Report, supra note 35, ¶ 102.
75 Id. ¶ 103.
76 Id.
77 Id. ¶¶ 102, 103.
78 Id. ¶ 106.
79 Id. ¶ 111, 112.
80 2009 Working Group Report, supra note 35, ¶ 109.
81 Id. ¶ 111.
82 2009 Rules Revision, supra note 50, ¶ 25, art. 26(9).
83 UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 8, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/703/Add.1 (March 5, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Rules Revision].
84 See UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Compilation of Comments by Governments and International 
Organizations, 13, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/704 (May 4, 2010) (in which the international organization Corporate Counsel International 
Arbitration Group (CCIAG) complains that Article 26(9) is “incomprehensible” and suggests a more workable wording).
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and this may be a good reason for its absolute omission from the 
Rules. If the aim of the provision was to allow for preliminary 
orders as long as the applicable domestic law did not prohibit 
them, while leaving all rights and powers of parties, domestic 
courts, and arbitral tribunals intact according to the domestic 
law no matter what, the provision as submitted to the General 
Assembly did the opposite: it seemed to disallow preliminary 
orders under the arbitral regime while allowing them under 
applicable domestic law, if that law allowed them, so that if 
parties wished to request preliminary orders they would be 
obliged to apply to a domestic court.85
In the end, nothing further illuminates exactly why the 
provision on ex parte preliminary orders was summarily omitted 
from the Arbitration Rules after a lengthy deliberation process 
finally concluding in a compromise acceptable to the entire 
Working Group, but its elimination has several implications. For 
one, opposition to inclusion of preliminary orders in the Rules 
regime was very strong and based on fundamental concerns that 
such a provision would undermine the Rules’ wide acceptability. 
Perhaps, in the end, the interests of maintaining the Rules’ 
attractiveness to a broad spectrum of parties and institutions 
superseded the impetus to provide guidelines regarding a 
controversial arbitration practice. Secondly, however, the absence 
of a provision on preliminary orders means that the Rules are 
silent on a very controversial area of existing practice, and this 
ambiguity seems contrary to the revisionary goal of updating 
guidelines so as to bring consistency to international commercial 
arbitration practices. Finally, that the Working Group overcame 
such contention to arrive at a compromise provision indicates 
that its inclusion was an important part of the modernization 
effort bringing consistency to the UNCITRAL arbitration 
system, so that its elimination from the adopted revision of the 
Arbitration Rules points to a significant gap between the Model 
Law and the Rules, as well as a general inconsistency with the 
aims of the UNCITRAL regime as a whole. 
Because the Model Law includes extensive provisions on 
preliminary orders, but the Arbitration Rules do not mention 
them at all, rights of parties to request and arbitral tribunals’ 
powers to grant such orders are left completely to the applicable 
domestic law. This could be problematic, for instance, because 
many states have not adopted the 2006 Model Law, and when 
both domestic law and the arbitration agreement are silent as to 
whether preliminary orders are acceptable, parties and arbitrators 
may be confused as to their rights and powers. Indeed, because 
the Rules are silent on preliminary orders entirely, parties, 
domestic courts, and arbitral tribunals may interpret the Rules 
incorrectly as generally disallowing preliminary orders even 
where applicable domestic law allows them.
IV. Conclusion
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were revised in order 
to reflect changes in international arbitration practice, provide 
guidelines for parties and arbitral tribunals, and bring consistency 
to the UNCITRAL system in conflux with the new 2006 Model 
Law. However, several differences between the Model Law and 
the revised Arbitration Rules reveal their different scopes and 
range of applicability. Much of this is due to the fundamental 
differences in nature, such that the Rules must be more widely 
acceptable to parties agreeing to an arbitration format. This 
means that the Rules are shorter, simpler, and more flexible than 
the Model Law, which is intended as a model for lawmakers. 
This greater flexibility in the Rules takes the form, for instance, 
of textual differences broadening the definition of circumstances 
and conditions that may justify the use of interim measures. At 
the same time, the Rules attempt to provide clarity for parties 
and arbitrators, for instance by clearly allocating the risk of later 
assignation of liability for damages to parties requesting interim 
measures, in the event that a determination on the merits of the 
dispute proves the interim measure was unjustified.
However, even though the revised Rules do provide 
greater clarity and consistency with the Model Law, some of 
the differences between them reveal gaps in the international 
arbitration system as a whole that may prove problematic. 
One such gap arises from the fundamental distinct natures of 
the Rules and Model Law: in states that have not implemented 
legislation based on the Model Law, mechanisms ensuring 
enforcement of interim measures may be lacking, and because 
the Rules’ reach goes only so far as contracting parties—and not 
national legislation or enforcement—in these states enforcement 
of interim measures may be as handicapped as ever. In these 
instances, the modifications of the UNCITRAL regime on 
interim measures would be moot.
Another gap arises regarding the issue of ex parte 
preliminary orders, because where the Model Law contains 
extensive provisions on preliminary orders, the Arbitration 
Rules are completely silent. This has the overall effect of 
creating ambiguity as to the permissibility of preliminary orders 
under the UNCITRAL regime, because although the Model Law 
permits them the implication of the Rules’ silence could be that 
preliminary orders are not permissible in arbitration contexts. In 
states that have not adopted the Model Law, this means that the 
Rules’ omission of a provision on preliminary orders mitigates 
against the acceptability of such measures regardless of whether 
domestic legislation permits them. In states that have adopted 
legislation based on the Model Law, the Rules’ omission could 
still have the same affect, in that although the domestic legislation 
85 See UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Compilation of Comments by Governments and International 
Organizations, 8, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/704/Add.1 (May 10, 2010) (in which El Salvador complains that Article 26(9) cannot be 
understood, and points out that the provision “seems to be referring to the right to appeal to a judicial tribunal” but in fact refers to an arbitral tribunal); UNCITRAL, 
Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Compilation of Comments by Governments and International Organizations, 6-7, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/704/Add.3 (May 12, 2010) (in which the international organization Forum for International Conciliation and 
Arbitration (FACACIC) complains that Article 26(9) is unclear and seems to indicate a prohibition of any ex parte applications by the Rules regardless of domestic 
law).
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clearly intends to allow preliminary orders, the arbitral tribunal 
and the parties may not find support for preliminary orders as a 
matter of contract. Both cases are inconsistent with the overall aim 
of the UNCITRAL system regarding ex parte preliminary orders, 
which is not to preclude such measures as an arbitral mechanism 
long as applicable domestic law does not prohibit them.
In conclusion, the revised UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do 
provide greater clarity and more specific guidelines for practice, 
within a framework that is more flexible and widely applicable 
than the Model Law. In some cases, this greater flexibility was 
even achieved through greater textual specificity and more 
detailed definitions. However, in the opposite circumstance, 
where the Rules are less specific than the Model Law (as is the case 
with the issue of preliminary orders), lack of specificity does not 
necessarily equate with more flexibility. In fact, these areas may 
be in need of clarification in order to preserve the very flexibility 
so vital to the Rules’ widespread acceptance and usefulness. 
Unfortunately, the provision on preliminary measures—on 
which there was impetus to adopt a neutral provision, though 
perhaps the hasty revisions made it incomprehensible, resulting 
in its unfortunate deletion—is one such issue, and only future 
practice or further revision remain to illuminate how the gaps 
between the Model Law and the Arbitration Rules will affect 
the availability of ex parte preliminary orders in international 
commercial arbitration.
